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Electronic Health Records: Delivering the
Right Information to the Right Health Care
Providers at the Right Time
There is no health without management, and there is 
no management without information.
Gonzalo Vecina Neto, Head,
Brazilian National Health Regulatory Agency
Introduction
In 1993 I wrote:
Communication and information management 
consume as much as 40 percent of all inpatient 
costs, yet errors still occur at an unacceptable 
rate. The Institute of Medicine has suggested that 
electronic medical records (EMRs) will help lower 
health care costs, maintain quality of care, and 
provide physicians with better information. (Tierney 
et al. 1993, 379)
Nearly 20 years later I’m here to tell you how far we’ve come 
toward implementing EHRs nationwide, and what we’ve learned 
from our experience at the Regenstrief Institute in Indiana 
University.
Most of us consider health care to be a service business, because 
we think in terms of a patient who goes to the doctor to get some 
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thing: advice, medication, devices, surgery, or physical therapy. 
I’m going to argue that what patients really get, and health care 
practitioners really provide, is information. Ninety-eight percent 
of what we who practice medicine do is not the end result, the end 
service, but the overall process of getting there.
I would also argue that medicine is more of an information 
business than, say, banking. With banking, if I put $100 in the 
bank, I know exactly how much it is, where it is, and what I can 
do with it, which is not the case with medicine. If you come to 
my hospital for a chest x-ray, the chest x-ray shows maybe there’s 
an infi ltrate, or some abnormal substance, in the lungs that could 
be pneumonia, could be cancer, could be...and so you get a list of 
things that it might be. If you have a fever and a cough with a little 
bit of green in it, it’s probably pneumonia. I then have to fi gure 
out, is it vital pneumonia or bacterial? If it’s bacterial, what kind of 
bacterium is causing it? What antibiotics is it likely sensitive to? 
And what antibiotics are available in my hospital that will likely be 
effective in treating it? I could go through that reasoning process 
appropriately and miss the fact that this pneumonia is due to the 
obstruction of a bronchus due to lung cancer. 
Health care providers dig through patient records, gathering 
information based on a history, a physical exam, and laboratory 
test results. Physicians record information in notes and sometimes 
registries. They process that information, balance the risks 
and the benefi ts, come up with the most likely and least likely 
diagnoses, and then, based on all the various probabilities, make 
a series of decisions (yes—do this, no—don’t do that). They 
transmit information about those decisions as advice, orders, 
communications, letters, and emails to other people. So health 
care is a much more information-intensive and information-fuzzy 
business than banking (see McDonald and Tierney 1986a, b).
And ultimately it’s the doctor’s responsibility to decide what to 
do when the various kinds of information contradict each other. 
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My colleagues and I did a study of over 4,000 echocardiograms 
(an ultrasound test to look at the inside of a patient’s heart for 
structural problems) recorded at a large Veterans Administration 
medical center to assess the level of agreement between the two 
main diagnostic assessments of heart function that resulted from 
each test (Subramanian et al. 2003). We found that the numeric, 
or quantitative, measurements as performed by a sonography 
technician, and the textual, or qualitative, interpretation as 
provided by a cardiologist differed on the same echocardiograms a 
third of the time. 
My point is this: the quality, effi ciency, and effectiveness of 
health care depends on our ability to manage information. This 
information is messy and sometimes contradictory, and unless 
you’re a fi ctional doctor on TV, like Marcus Welby, MD, and 
have only one patient to care for, you have to manage information 
electronically. It can’t be done effectively any other way. 
The Regenstrief Institute
The Regenstrief Institute, Inc. is a non-profi t research organization 
with effective partnerships with the Indiana University School 
of Medicine and the Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion 
County, Indiana. It was founded in 1969 with the idea of applying 
the techniques of biomedical science, computer science, and 
industrial engineering to health care settings “to improve medical 
care, to provide rational methods for marshaling resources, and 
to foster the use of quantitative methods in medical decision and 
policy making” (http://www.regenstrief.org/mission/history).
In 1972, long before the Internet even existed, the Regenstrief 
Medical Records System (RMRS) was launched, with three goals 
in mind:
(1) to eliminate the logistic problems of the paper 
record by making clinical data immediately 
Lourie Memorial Lecture on Health Policy
4
available to authorized users wherever they are—
no more unavailable or undecipherable clinical 
records; (2) to reduce the work of clinical book 
keeping required to manage patients—no more 
missed diagnoses when laboratory evidence shouts 
its existence, no more forgetting about required 
preventive care; (3) to make the informational 
‘gold’ in the medical record accessible to clinical, 
epidemiologic, outcomes and management research. 
(McDonald et al. 1999, 226)
In 1994, the Regenstrief Institute extended the RMRS to the 
Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC), a city-wide clinical 
informatics network in Indianapolis that has since grown to cover 
more than 70 hospitals state-wide (Biondich and Grannis 2004; 
Clement et al. 2005). Throughout its history, the Institute has been 
the leading center for randomized controlled trials of medical 
informatics interventions in the country. In this Policy Brief I 
discuss some of our research, including examples of what we 
learned works and doesn’t work in clinical settings.
Canopy Computing 
The rain forest canopy is a seamless web through 
which arboreal creatures effi ciently move to 
reach the edible fruits without any attention to the 
individual trees. Individual health care computer 
systems are rich with patient data, but rather than 
a canopy linking all the trees in the forest, the data 
‘fruit’ come from a diverse forest of individual 
computer ‘trees’—laboratory systems, word 
processing systems, pharmacy systems, and the 
like. These different sources of patient information 
are diffi cult or impossible to reach by individual 
physicians, especially from their offi ces. The World 
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Wide Web and other standardization technology 
provide physicians and their institutions the tools 
needed for seamless and secure access to their 
patients’ data and to medical information, when and 
where they need it. (McDonald et al. 1998, 1325)
What we call the health information canopy or canopy computing 
is an electronic nervous system through which information fl ows, 
connected to everything. I want to help you understand the density 
and intensity of information in health care, and how clinical data 
might be used—not only in caring for one patient at a time—
but also to improve the systems of care, especially the quality 
effectiveness, effi ciency, and outcomes of care. 
Ideally, clinicians and their care institutions are connected by 
this electronic network. If the information I need to manage my 
patient is out there, I should be able to get what I want without 
having to be in the facility where that information resides. People 
practicing medicine in this canopy ought to expect that they can 
get their hands on the data they need and that it will be available 
for everyday decision making in practice. But in 2010, Clement 
McDonald’s vivid rainforest metaphor from the 1990s has still not 
been realized.
Ideal vs. Reality
To illustrate our lack of progress, I’m going to give you two 
scenarios. First, imagine that a patient presents himself in an 
optimum health care environment where information is available 
at the right time, at the right place, to the right people, and can be 
managed in the right way. 
Scenario 1: The Ideal
An 81-year-old man arrives at the emergency department in an 
ambulance. He’s awake but he’s confused. He has sustained a fall. 
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He is unable to give a cogent history and nobody accompanied 
him in the ambulance. This is not uncommon in an emergency 
department (ED) setting. People just show up and you don’t know 
anything about them. But in this scenario, the physician looks up 
the medical history in a city-wide information system and fi nds:
A neurologist’s note says the patient has a history of multiple 
system atrophy (MSA), which is a combination of dizziness 
(his blood pressure drops when he stands up), problems with 
balance (cerebellar dysfunction), and Parkinsonism. He had a 
toxic reaction in the past to low-dose Sinemet, a drug that’s used 
to treat Parkinson’s disease, which caused severe agitation and 
hallucinations. 
Primary care notes in the same record show that the patient 
had a small increase in his cardiac enzymes during an earlier 
hospitalization for pneumonia, so his primary care physician put 
him on aspirin and a platelet inhibitor called clopidogrel, or Plavix. 
This combination increases the risk of bleeding in the brain with 
head trauma.
A social service note shows that the patient insisted on living 
alone in his home after his wife died. He has four adult children 
who live out of state and he’s receiving 24-hour live-in support 
from non-medical personnel. 
The record includes a physical therapy note that the patient has 
made great progress in weight and balance training, but he falls 
unless he uses his walker. Unfortunately, he has mild dementia and 
impaired memory, so he often forgets to use his walker. Hence the 
fall. 
The city-wide information system shows he’s on a medication to 
keep him from losing water, which works kind of the opposite of a 
diuretic, and is used for people with MSA. But it tends to raise his 
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blood pressure. He takes esomeprazole (Nexium) for acid refl ux, 
aspirin, a multi-vitamin, and Tylenol for pain. 
He has a living will that says he doesn’t want to have any 
extraordinary life-prolonging medical treatments.
A physical examination in the ED shows him to have severe 
dizziness and his blood pressure drops when he stands up. His 
neurological exam doesn’t point to anything in particular, although 
he’s got a Parkinsonian tremor. He has ataxia—he staggers when 
he walks. He’s got an enlarged prostate. He is awake and can talk, 
but he has a mild expressive aphasia, that is, he has trouble getting 
the words out.
His laboratory examination is completely normal except for a 
mild or moderate increase in his creatinine, meaning his kidneys 
don’t function quite right. And a head CT scan shows he had a 
small bleed between the hemispheres of his brain (intrafalcial 
hematoma) and he’s got severe atrophy of his brain, which happens 
to people with dementia. The bleed has not compressed parts of the 
brain so it should not be causing any neurological problems.  The 
neurosurgeon sees the patient in the emergency room and says, “I 
want to admit him and watch him, just observe him for 24 hours. 
I don’t think that there’s anything acute going on, but let’s watch 
him.” 
The ED physician calls the out-of-state daughter listed as next of 
kin in the city-wide medical record and informs her of her father’s 
condition and admission to the hospital. The ED physician also 
collects additional data about the medical history and quality 
of life, as well as the patient’s desire to avoid extraordinary and 
invasive treatments. He then e-mails the neurologist and primary 
care physicians to let them know the patient’s in the hospital and 
why, and what’s being done. 
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The ED physician calls the hospitalist to inform him that the 
patient is being admitted to him and discusses the condition and the 
plans. The hospitalist reviews the data, calls the daughter, confi rms 
the information collected by the ED physician, and discusses 
plans. The hospitalist writes admitting orders using the Computer 
Physician Order Entry (CPOE) system, which informs him of the 
prior adverse reaction to Sinemet. The neurosurgeon follows up the 
next day, repeats the examination and the CT scan, which are both 
unchanged, and recommends discharge after 24 hours.
The hospitalist discusses discharge plans with the family, in-home 
caregivers, physical therapists, and social services or e-mails the 
plans to them, all of whom he can identify because they’re all 
listed in the same city-wide record, even though they don’t all 
work in the same hospital. The discharge note contains a summary 
of what happened to the patient, what was done in the hospital, 
and what the plans were at discharge. Follow-up appointments are 
made electronically with the neurologist, primary care physician, 
and physical therapist.
Remember that story because we’ll return to it. 
Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC)
The Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC) was launched in 
1994 with funding from the National Institutes of Health and 
the National Library of Medicine. Its charter fi ve major hospital 
systems include 15 different hospital facilities and more than 100 
geographically distributed clinics and day surgery facilities in 
Central Indiana (http://www.regenstrief.org/medinformatics/inpc). 
Collectively these fi ve systems admit about 170,000 patients, and 
serve about 400,000 ED visits and 2.7 million clinic visits per 
year. To date, more than 70 hospitals have joined INPC, which 
required establishing more than 1400 separate interfaces with 
these hospitals’ information systems. All INPC facilities deliver 
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registration records, laboratory test reports, and selected other 
records for hospital admissions and ED visits to a central INPC 
server. The data are automatically standardized in format and 
coding as they arrive at the server, and patients with multiple 
medical records are linked. Each institution’s INPC record has 
the same fi le structure and shares the same term directory that 
contains the codes, names (and other attributes) for tests, drugs, 
coded answers, and so on. There are more than 3 billion ‘structured 
results,’ individual items for more than 11 million patients, and 
this number doubles every four months. When a patient is seen in 
any of the EDs operated by the member hospitals, and the patient 
consents, all of the information about that one patient from all 
INPC facilities can be presented as one virtual medical record. 
In 2001-2002, to learn how much patients migrate throughout a 
community, that is, obtain health care (and generate clinical data) 
in more than one hospital system, the INPC examined the records 
of nearly 500,000 patient visits to the EDs of hospitals in the 
fi ve charter health care systems within the network that provide 
most of the acute medical care and found that of the patients who 
had sought ED care in one hospital setting during that period, 60 
percent had clinical records in another hospital system (Finnell et 
al. 2003). Using data from the Centers for Disease Control they 
extrapolated that “20.6 million ED visits [nationwide] would have 
clinical information located in another, separate facility” (2003, 
237). 
Unfortunately, in most of the rest of the country we still don’t 
have a health information canopy. Instead, we have freestanding, 
unconnected, vertical silos of information. We try to connect the 
silos by various means, such as a telephone call to ask for a fax of 
somebody’s discharge summary from another hospital.
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Scenario 2: What Really Happened
Now I’m going to go back through the story I told you earlier, this 
time telling not the idealized version, as if all the information were 
available, but how it really happened in a large town in Florida.
An eighty-one year old man arrives in the emergency department. 
That part doesn’t change. The man arrives with no information. 
He’s never been to this hospital before. There are no records 
available, no known next of kin, nobody to call. A physical 
examination shows the same thing as before: the patient is dizzy, 
orthostatic, ataxic, falls and can’t speak very well. The diagnostic 
test results are the same—a bleed in the brain, abnormal renal 
function, and so on. The neurosurgeon’s recommendation is the 
same; the patient is hospitalized for observation. The hospitalist 
discusses this information with the ED physician and writes 
admitting orders on paper, which at some time later are transcribed 
and acted upon. The patient’s in-home caregiver calls the daughter 
to say that her father has been hospitalized. The daughter calls the 
hospital and is told by the nurse who represents the hospital, “Your 
father’s in intensive care, his condition is critical, but I can’t tell 
you any more because of HIPAA.”
For those who don’t know, HIPAA refers to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Affordability Act, which was enacted by Congress 
in 1996. HIPAA was supposed to make information more portable 
and to encourage the structured electronic transmission of health 
care data. However, the law’s complicated privacy rules have 
turned out to have exactly the opposite effect. Quality of care has 
been sacrifi ced on the altar of confi dentiality.
And that’s what happens in this case. No information is available 
to the clinician, so the clinician doesn’t know, for example, about 
the patient’s previous toxic reaction to Sinemet. The daughter 
asks to speak to the physicians and the nurse representative says, 
“You can’t talk to the doctors without permission from the patient, 
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and the patient didn’t give any written permission.” The fact 
that he can’t give permission because he was hospitalized due to 
cognitive dysfunction doesn’t make any difference to the hospital 
offi cial. So the admitting order includes Sinemet for a Parkinsonian 
tremor. He becomes very agitated and delirious, for which he is 
given a sedative. The patient becomes over sedated, then vomits 
and aspirates—inhaling the vomit into his lungs. The patient has 
trouble breathing, experiences a prolonged period of hypoxia (low 
oxygen in his blood), and is put on a ventilator. He lapses into 
a coma. The next day, the CT scan results haven’t changed, and 
the neurosurgeon repeats his exam and fi nds the same thing: no 
evidence that the small intracranial bleed is causing any problems. 
There are no other focal fi ndings, and the neurosurgeon doesn’t 
know why the patient is in a coma, except that it isn’t due to the 
bleed in his head, so it must be something else—perhaps the 
prolonged period of hypoxia.
The patient’s living will is not available. The patient’s oldest son 
is fi nally contacted, on advice from the caregiver, and because he 
didn’t know that there was a living will he says, “Do everything.” 
The patient is successfully weaned from ventilation and has the 
breathing tube pulled out. Unfortunately, the patient vomits and 
aspirates again and the tube is re-inserted. 
The patient’s condition doesn’t improve, so he is transferred to 
a nursing home without any accompanying information. The 
nursing home has no idea why the patient is there, but they think 
it is because he has pneumonia and Parkinson’s disease. No 
family members are notifi ed by the hospital or the nursing home 
that the patient has been transferred out of the hospital. There is 
no communication between the nursing home physicians and the 
family for a week despite frantic attempts by the family to contact 
them. The patient has a respiratory arrest at the nursing home, 
undergoes a full resuscitation effort which is unsuccessful, and 
dies. 
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The patient in this scenario was my father, and you can say in 
very real terms that his death was caused by HIPAA and lack of 
information fl ow between his health care providers. 
The US Lags in Advanced EHR Capacity Among 
Developed Countries
The Commonwealth Fund surveyed primary care physicians in 
eleven highly developed countries and found that among doctors 
who reported using ‘basic’ electronic medical records in their 
practice, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway were at the 
top (nearly 100% usage), while the United States and Canada 
ranked at the bottom, with 46% and 37% respectively (Schoen et 
al. 2009). Among those who reported using ‘advanced’ electronic 
information functions (such as electronic medical records, and 
electronic prescribing and ordering of tests) Australia and New 
Zealand led, at 91% and 92% respectively, followed by the United 
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and eventually 
the United States at 26%. Norway, France, and Canada were at the 
bottom.
It isn’t because we physicians don’t have computers in our offi ces. 
Nearly all physician practices in the US use computers, mostly 
because the insurance companies demand it for billing. But fewer 
than half of those practices use computers for electronic records 
to support the delivery of care. The benefi ts of EHRs are not 
immediately apparent to many doctors.
Some years ago, I went to a wedding where a friend introduced 
me to the father of the bride. Striking up a conversation with him, 
I asked, “What do you do?” He said “I’m a family physician. And 
I want to tell you I’m really pissed off right now ’cause we are 
installing this electronic medical record system in my offi ce and 
it’s driving us crazy. We had a really effi cient offi ce and now we’re 
trying to put in these computers and it slows me down—I can’t 
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do what I want to do, and it’s driving me crazy! So—what do you 
do?” (I’m not making this up....)
I explained what I did, having spent a career creating, installing, 
and studying EHRs. Then I described the Indiana Health 
Information Exchange (IHIE) and the INPC. I described my 
patient who was admitted with an infected elbow. By accessing 
his city-wide record I found out he had been admitted to fi ve other 
hospitals in our city in the past 18 months with joints on the left 
side of his body infected with fecal-oral organisms. This guy was 
self-mutilating by injecting himself with stool. I would never have 
known that if his other records weren’t available, even in another 
system.
He replied, “If I knew what happened to my patients outside 
of my offi ce, then everything I’m going through to implement 
the new health record system would be worth it—because my 
biggest frustration is not knowing what’s happening to my patients 
somewhere else.” 
Local Health Information Infrastructure
When Clement McDonald foresaw health information networks 
and canopy computing back in 1988, people didn’t ‘get it.’ People 
understand this better now because of their experience surfi ng the 
Internet. We’re moving to a single worldwide computer called 
the web, one global computer, one global mind. Apple created 
the model for this with the iPhone. Apple didn’t have to do it all 
themselves. They took the approach that they would create the 
platform and let somebody else write applications for it. Just 
having the thing out there and having access to the data means 
people can then write innovative applications that do something 
with those data. We’ve gotten used to expecting this in every 
context but health care. I can fi nd out everything I want to know 
about my favorite ballplayer by simply typing his name into 
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Google®. I think we ought to expect the same type of response 
in health care, too. That’s what the canopy should do: provide 
the information I need for my patient regardless of where it was 
generated or stored. The future of high quality affordable care 
depends on such innovation. 
What elements are required to build a working local health 
information infrastructure (LHII)? 
Uniform coding system. If you have a chest x-ray done in one 
hospital, providers in other facilities need to know that it’s a chest 
x-ray and what it showed, so you have to have a common code 
for things. You could use words, but which ones? There are many 
different ways of labeling things: chest x-ray, chest xray without a 
dash, or maybe chest radiograph. In 1994 the Regenstrief Institute 
developed LOINC (Logical Observation Identifi ers Names and 
Codes) as a universal standard for identifying medical laboratory 
observations (http://loinc.org). It has since been expanded to 
include more than 58,000 observation terms, and it has been 
adopted by the federal government as a standard for the electronic 
exchange of clinical health information. 
Real time data fl ow. The data have to fl ow up and into the system 
and down to the individual providers. To do that, you have to have 
a standard message format. Think of the front of an envelope: you 
can tell by the location and format of the information who the 
letter is to, who it’s from, and when and where it was postmarked. 
There’s a standard coding format called Health Level Seven 
International, or HL-7 (http://www.hl7.org) that will take a long 
string of data and turn it into something that’s meaningful to a 
computer. HL7 is the most widely accepted standard format for 
health information exchange.
Data repository. This can be a single database, collecting data 
from all these hospitals and putting them in one database. Or you 
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can keep them in separate databases where a querying program 
can access this federation of databases and retrieve individual 
patient data very rapidly to create what’s known as a virtual 
record, which is how INPC operates. Every hospital has its own 
database because, while hospitals are willing to share information, 
they prefer to maintain their own records and dictate the rules 
under which those records will be shared. Rarely in its 20+ year 
history have there been breaches of security in INPC and no 
major occasions when people’s data have been used for nefarious 
purposes. 
Interface engine. This provides access to the data once they’re 
in the database. You enter the patient’s name or identifying 
number, specify the data you want, and it displays on the screen. 
The information may come from several different places, but you 
see it combined on one screen as if it is from a single database. 
The system has to be usable by both people and other computer 
programs. My hospital may want to know how well we treat 
diabetes, so we identify diabetics, look at their blood sugars done 
by any number of different doctors, and see how effectively they’re 
being managed. All of that can be done by extracting data from the 
data exchange.
Most Data Are Already Electronic
There’s no longer a paper chart in our hospital. Integrated inpatient 
and outpatient registration and scheduling systems, diagnoses 
and admission, discharge, transfer (ADT) systems, lab systems, 
pharmacy systems, radiology systems—being able to view an x-ray 
anywhere—are all innovations that have come about in the last fi ve 
to seven years.
When that fi rst became available. I had a young woman admitted 
to me with chest pain. I looked up her x-ray on my offi ce computer 
before I went to see her—it hadn’t been read by the radiologist 
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yet—and it showed the patient had a small airway that had 
ruptured, causing a spontaneous pneumothorax, or collapsed lung. 
I immediately transferred the patient to surgery, a chest tube was 
inserted, and she left the hospital in a day or two. I could manage 
her care from a distance within seconds because I knew where 
this piece of information was, and could access it from a distance 
without having to run around to fi nd it. 
Not All Important Data Are Electronic
But you need to know that there are some important things that we 
providers do not record.
Past history, unless it happened within our network, is not 
available. 
Family history. 
Symptoms. We might occasionally write them in notes, but don’t 
record them in a way that they can be retrieved by a computer. 
Quality of life assessments, either formal systems such as the 
RAND Medical Outcomes Study 36-Item Short Form Survey (SF-
36), or what I call the SF-1, the “How you doin’?” question. We 
don’t record that, but I think we’re going to have to in the future. 
Mental health, for example, is way ahead of the rest of medicine 
because they have standard instruments to assess and record 
important symptomatic conditions like depression. 
Vital signs, if they’re not done with an electronic cuff, are almost 
never recorded in a place where they’re actually available. 
Telephone communications, verbal orders, and prescriptions are 
often simply written on pieces of paper. 
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Selected outcomes, such as responses to medications. You may be 
able to tell what the patient is taking, but you also want to know 
how well they’ve responded to it in the past or what they have 
taken that they have not responded to, and the patient may not be 
able to tell you. 
True health care costs. We know charges really well. We don’t 
know what drugs and tests, etc. really cost patients, providers, and 
health care facilities. And charges are a myth, they’re whatever 
people are willing to pay...or not. They have little relationship to 
what we or our insurance companies actually pay for our care.
Barriers to Using Current Electronic Data
Lack of connectivity for transporting data. If somebody goes 
outside of your system, outside of your network, how do you 
get the data to somebody else? If you’re in one of the Veterans 
Administration’s 1,719 medical centers or other health care 
facilities, they all have the same electronic record system. Kaiser 
Permanente is somewhat the same way. Not many other places can 
do that, and it’s a problem because that’s what we’re aiming for 
with the interoperability that’s demanded by the new health care 
act. Outside facilities may be connected to the Internet, but they 
don’t have effi cient and effective ways of transmitting data, and 
they often use different data models and coding systems. 
Worries about data security and HIPAA. We’ve held focus 
groups in Indianapolis with poor inner-city patients to explore their 
thoughts about sharing data between their health care providers 
(doctors and pharmacies and the like), and the most common 
answer we got was “You don’t do that already? Why not?” They 
think providers ought to be sharing because most patients know 
they’ll get better care if the information follows them when they go 
to get care in different places. 
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Competition between providers. This presents additional barriers. 
Doctors may say “I don’t want to give you data about my patient 
because you may steal my patient.” Controlling the patient’s 
information can control where the patient gets care. 
Inertia. This is also a problem. Many physicians don’t want to 
do anything new. They’re often incredibly busy and comfortable 
with the status quo, and change takes time. That’s the most 
expensive thing in changing health care systems—not technology, 
not personnel, but the time it takes to re-engineer and redevelop 
systems of care. 
The general disconnect between cost and savings. Many 
physicians think, “If I put an electronic medical record system in 
my offi ce practice, it saves money for the insurance company and 
for the patient and for the employer, but it doesn’t save me any 
money, so why should I pay for it? ”
Overcoming Those Barriers
Today, computers and e-literacy are pervasive. Nearly everybody 
uses a computer and understands what computers are capable of 
doing, so we’ve got at least the trunks of the canopy. During a 
recent study of a system for capturing adverse drug events that we 
conducted in rural research networks in Connecticut, Texas, and 
Oregon, as well as urban practices in Los Angeles, we developed 
a completely separate system that required only standalone 
computers without using the Internet (Hickner et al. 2010). We 
even included another system that was on paper, but the standalone 
computer and paper versions were rarely used because everyone 
had access to the Internet in their offi ces. 
In his 2004 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush 
announced creation of the Offi ce of the National Coordinator for 
Health and Information Technology (ONCHIT) and committed the 
United States to going to electronic health records in the next 10 to 
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15 years. In 2009 the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act was enacted as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Pub. L. 111-5, Subtitle 
A, Section 4104(a)). It promotes the adoption and “meaningful 
use” of health information technology in the US. It provides 
payment incentives to physicians who implement an EHR system 
under either Medicare or Medicaid between 2011 and 2016. Today, 
if you can show that you’re capturing data in your practice or your 
hospital and you have the ability to share it with other people, and 
if you’re using inter-operable standards of messaging and coding, 
then you’re going to get $40,000 per physician. So now we’ve 
begun aligning costs and benefi ts. 
By 2013, you have to show that you can do advanced care and 
decision supports with your system. And by 2015, you have to 
start showing you’ve improved outcomes, and you’re going to get 
penalized, meaning getting lower payments from Medicare, if you 
don’t use electronic medical records in a “meaningful” way. 
We are beginning to see very creative uses of health information 
technology to solve some sticky problems in US health care. For 
example, some hospitals that can’t afford 24/7 physician coverage 
in their ICUs rely on clinicians in India to monitor patients in their 
Electronic Intensive Care Units (EICUs) late at night, looking at 
the data and acting on it when needed. While some doctors may 
view this technology as a threat to the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship, it may be better than having nobody watching and 
capable of intervening. Besides, as Howard Bleich, one of the other 
pioneers of medical informatics, noted in 1985, “Any doctor who 
can be replaced by a computer deserves to be.” 
Computer-based Physician Order Entry
One of the innovations required by the HITECH Act is Computer-
based Physician Order Entry (CPOE). The Institute of Medicine 
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(2006) recommends CPOE be used universally to write orders to 
avoid adverse drug events (ADEs). The National Quality Forum 
(NQF) lists CPOE as one of its safe practices (NQF 2008). And 
CPOE is one of the benchmarks that the Leapfrog Group (2000) 
recommends for universal adoption by hospitals to reduce serious 
medication errors and thereby promote patient safety.
This ought to help us improve both the quality and the safety of 
health care, and lower its costs. How might it help? 
Providing alerts about drug interactions, drug diagnosis 
interactions, warnings, and duplicate therapy—identifying 
instances where a patient’s already received this drug from 
somebody else.
Transmitting data electronically, and quickly, to the right people. 
Providing basic clinical decision support, such as limiting tests 
to ones that actually exist in the institution you’re working in or 
ordering only those drugs that you actually have in your formulary 
or which the patient’s insurance allows without special approvals. 
Aiding in dosing of drugs based on the patient’s weight and 
kidney function. Some of us have trouble doing those calculations 
in our heads. This can also prevent doctors from ordering a drug in 
a toxic range; you can’t order something that’s ten times the dose, 
or something in milligrams when should be in micrograms, like 
thyroid medication. 
Checking on allergies. If someone came into the ED ten years 
ago with an allergy to a medication, that information ought to be 
in the system forever so when that person comes into any system 
connected to that ED that information should be displayed to a 
doctor trying to order that medication. 
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Then there are advanced levels of support that you can build into 
CPOE systems, such as: 
Identifying patients who are at a higher risk for a condition, 
such as heart disease, who can be targeted for specifi c 
interventions, such as behavior modifi cation programs. 
Suggesting ‘corollary orders’ such as a follow-up test to a change 
in medication. 
Pointing out appropriate preventive care actions that are not 
being followed. 
Encouraging adherence to evidence-based practice guidelines, 
such as tighter than usual blood pressure control in patients with 
diabetes . 
Does CPOE Work?
Interestingly, there’s only been one randomized controlled trial 
of the use of CPOE in hospitals (Tierney et al. 1993). It’s the 
only one that exists for two reasons. First, such studies are hard 
to do because one has to set up two parallel systems for writing 
and managing orders without endangering patient safety. Second, 
given the recommendations of the IOM, NQF, Leapfrog group, 
and most recently the Offi ce of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology (ONCHIT 2010), CPOE is now 
the default expectation and required as part of the minimal use 
criteria. So there’s not going to be another controlled trial of CPOE 
use, which is too bad because I think a lot can be learned by what 
happens when you put these systems in place. In our CPOE study, 
some of the residents, faculty, and medical student teams in our 
hospital used paper orders and some used a home-grown CPOE 
system called The Medical Gopher (McDonald and Tierney 1986a) 
to write orders for more than 5,000 hospital patients over a two-
year period. All tasks in this system were menu driven. Menus 
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were problem and task-specifi c, so if a patient had heart failure 
a majority of the drugs, tests, and nursing orders were specifi c to 
heart failure. Eighty-fi ve percent of the orders were selected from 
menus, attesting to the quality of the menus. 
Half of the orders were written away from the patient’s ward. In 
cases where you don’t have CPOE, if you want to write an order on 
a patient who’s on a different fl oor, you either have to physically 
go there, spend precious time trying to locate the chart, and write 
the order down, or you have to telephone the ward nurse and give 
a verbal order which you hope will be written down and carried 
out correctly, all of which increases the chance of errors. However, 
with CPOE you could write orders anywhere in the hospital, even 
outside of the hospital, for somebody inside the hospital. The 
orders were then automatically sent not only to the ward, but to 
other places such as the pharmacy and the lab. The orders were 
legible, contained dates and times they were written, and were 
signed electronically. Physicians could search a patient’s electronic 
record, including numeric and coded data along with text reports, 
while writing an order. 
The system displayed and printed EKGs and their interpretations. 
It linked to our inquiry program to get data from prior tests, 
treatments, dictated reports, and so on from outside practices and 
institutions, when available. This was the beginning of the Indiana 
Network for Patient Care back in the late 1980s. Users also had 
access to patients’ advance directives, the American Hospital 
Formulary Service (ASHP) manual, selected electronic medical 
journals, and to the National Library of Medicine’s PubMed.
We found that during this two-year period there was a 13%, or 
$900 per admission, reduction in charges among CPOE users. 
Length of stay dropped by almost a full day. There was a twelve-
fold reduction in the time (from 6 hours to 30 minutes) it took for 
a patient to receive the fi rst treatment after being admitted to the 
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hospital, and the number of  drug-related incident reports were a 
third lower among CPOE users. We also performed a time-motion 
study where observers followed interns on admitting days when 
they were really busy. We found that it took the interns an extra 
half-hour a day to write orders by computer, about fi ve minutes per 
patient per day. But it also decreased by fi ve minutes to six minutes 
per day the time they spent looking for information. After we 
fi nished the study in 1991, the system was mandated hospital-wide 
and has been in continuous use ever since to write all inpatient 
and outpatient orders in the largest public hospital system in the 
country. 
Reminders for Preventive Care
We performed another study looking at reminders to physicians 
from interactive medical records, which showed that if you 
reminded physicians to do appropriate preventive care—occult 
blood testing, mammograms, prescribing weight reduction diets, 
administering vaccines—they did them almost twice as often 
(McDonald et al. 1984). As Francis Bacon said, “Men more 
frequently need to be reminded than informed.” The biggest 
increases in adherence were to physician-authored guidelines for 
preventive care.  
Monitoring for Adverse Events
There was a study of corollary or follow-up orders to monitor 
initial test results or treatments (Overhage et al. 1997), which I 
mentioned before. You order a drug; it’s got to be followed up 
with a test. For example, an increase in the dose of heparin (a 
blood thinning medicine given intravenously) should be followed 
by a test to measure blood clotting time. What if the system gave 
you the option to order that test automatically when the drug was 
ordered? We found that with reminders about corollary orders 
doubled the ordering of the appropriate drug-monitoring tests. 
The system made it easy for physicians, in that they didn’t have 
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to worry about remembering to order the follow-up tests later. It 
is important to note that when this intervention, like others before 
it, proved successful, it was broadly implemented as ‘usual care’ 
throughout our inner-city health care organization. 
Evidence-Based Suggestions for Care
Not all studies proved successful, however. In a study involving 
about 700 patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
asthma in our outpatient practice, we provided care suggestions 
based on local evidence-based practice guidelines (Tierney et 
al. 2005). For example, if a patient with asthma that was more 
than mild wasn’t on an inhaled corticosteroid, the doctors got 
a reminder in the middle of their outpatient CPOE ordering 
session. At the same time, the system would write an order for a 
beclomethasone oral inhaler; if you hit the return button, the order 
was processed, but if you hit any other button, it was not. We did 
this for a comprehensive set of guidelines for asthma and COPD.
The suggestions failed miserably. They had no effect on physician 
adherence to the guidelines, patient adherence to the target 
medications, exacerbation of the disease, costs, quality of life, 
or satisfaction with care. Why? Well, physicians felt guidelines 
were good for some things: they were a convenient source of 
information and a good educational tool. However, they also 
felt that the guidelines were too rigid to apply to an individual 
patient of theirs. They were concerned that they were enforcing 
‘cookbook’ medicine; that is, with the computer telling them 
what to do, they no longer had the autonomy that they wanted. 
They also worried that the suggestions were simply a means 
to decrease costs, rather than being about increasing quality of 
care. Interestingly, these were the same physicians and practices 
where computer reminders increased preventive care. Apparently, 
physicians don’t mind decision aids for preventive care, but they 
do mind when they suggest treatments. 
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We repeated this same study of computerized treatment guidelines 
for two other conditions, heart disease (Tierney et al. 2003) and 
hypertension (Murray et al. 2004), and we found the same thing. 
Why didn’t they work? 
For one thing, we didn’t focus on the right patients. When patients 
had mild disease, doctors apparently reasoned that unless the 
patient was doing badly, there was no reason to ‘rock the boat.’ 
Even if the evidence-based guidelines suggested this patient really 
ought to be on some other medication because it would prevent 
bad events, they didn’t want to change meds if the patient seemed 
to be doing okay. 
We also got the workfl ow wrong. Doctors wrote orders at the end 
of the visit, after the patient had already left the exam room. So if 
they wanted to change something they had to bring their patient 
back into the room and talk to them again. It was too hard; it’s 
easier to say, “I’ll do it next time.” But during the next visit, they 
didn’t remember to discuss changing treatment until reminded 
again after the patient was out of the room, so some things just 
didn’t get done. We didn’t fi gure out how to fi t this decision aid 
into their daily practice of medicine. 
And fi nally, it was just the wrong approach. Perhaps we didn’t 
involve the physicians enough in the process. Again, it seemed to 
be the computer telling them what to do, rather than their using 
the computer as a tool to help them tell themselves what to do. A 
better approach might be to present primary care physicians with 
a set of rules for which the computer could remind them, with the 
physicians having input into the triggers (e.g., the level of elevated 
blood pressure or the number of elevated blood pressures that were 
necessary before the computer suggested increasing the dose of 
that patient’s antihypertensive medication).
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So we tried a different approach in a study involving 720 
outpatients with chronic heart failure in two Veterans Affairs 
medical centers in Indianapolis and Seattle, Washington, in which 
we did engage the physicians (Subramanian et al. 2004). We met 
with VA physicians and asked them how the computer system 
might improve their care of patients with heart failure. They helped 
write the guidelines and how to identify patients who would be 
eligible for care suggestions. We then used mailed questionnaires 
to assess the patients two weeks before each visit—their functional 
class and symptoms and how they did since their last doctor visit. 
Then we added a reminder sheet that clipped to the patient’s paper 
chart before the doctor got to that patient. If your patient was in 
the intervention group, you got information about their current 
symptoms and whether they were doing better or worse. The 
reminder sheet included symptom information, the date of the 
test which had documented the patient’s heart failure, and “care 
options at this time” rather than suggested treatments. That is, 
instead of writing orders for treatments in the computer, the paper 
form contained a list of actions that you might consider doing. The 
control group was just given the information that their patient had 
heart failure.
Unfortunately, symptom information and care suggestion reminder 
sheets had no effect on physicians’ treatment decisions or patient 
outcomes, even among those patients who were not doing well, 
although the intervention patients were signifi cantly more satisfi ed 
with their physicians and the care they received. We think the 
reminder sheets engendered discussion between the doctors and 
the patients because they presented information about symptoms 
of those patients. However, they didn’t result in more intensive 
heart failure treatment and may actually have harmed the patients: 
there were more than double the number of hospitalizations at 
six months and at twelve months among the intervention group, 
although this could have been because intervention doctors were 
William M. Tierney
27
paying more attention to symptoms and hospitalizing patients who 
needed it who would not otherwise have been hospitalized.
Reminders to Discuss Advance Directives with At Risk Patients
Not all our studies had negative outcomes. In a study of reminders 
to discuss end-of-life care, we enrolled 1,000 patients who were at 
risk of needing such discussions because of their age (>75 years) 
or because they had serious medical conditions such as heart, lung, 
liver, or kidney disease, cancer, or stroke (Dexter et al. 1998). 
The computer suggested that doctors talk to their patients about 
advance directives, using either what we call instruction directives 
(“Do you want to have a ventilator; artifi cial nutrition; surgery, 
if it’s indicated medically but you’re in a situation where you’re 
terminally ill and not likely to get better?”) or proxy directives 
(“Who do you want speaking for you? Who do you want to be your 
health care representative?”) Physicians got either reminders to 
talk about advance directives, reminders to talk about proxies, both 
or neither.  
After every visit the patients were asked, “Did your doctor talk 
to you about end-of-life care?” and how satisfi ed they were with 
their doctor and the visit just completed. Among patients whose 
physicians did not receive reminders, doctors talked to them 
about advance directives only 2% of the time, a little more often 
if they got reminders for proxy directives, and a little bit more for 
instruction directives. When physicians received both reminders, 
more than 20% of them talked to their patients, and two-thirds 
of the time that they talked to their patients an advance directive 
form was fi lled out. In this case, a simple computer reminder 
increased the likelihood of doctors talking to their patients about 
the prickly issue of end-of-life care. Importantly, even though a lot 
of times doctors are kind of uncomfortable broaching the subject, 
patients preferred that their doctor talked with them about advance 
directives and end-of-life care in the primary care clinic rather than 
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in the ICU and were more satisfi ed with their doctors and primary 
care when such discussions occurred.
Enhancing Communication between Providers
We’ve performed studies in other settings besides hospitals and 
doctors’ offi ces. In one study, we assessed the effectiveness of a 
pharmacy-based care program for patients with asthma or chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease who went to one of 36 community 
drugstores to refi ll their prescriptions (Weinberger et al. 2002). The 
pharmacists received patient-specifi c data from patients’ electronic 
health records on peak expiratory fl ow rates, past use of breathing 
medications, and recent ER visits for breathing problems. They 
were also given customized patient educational materials and 
resources that were to be used by the pharmacists to inform those 
patients whose were not doing well. In one control group, patients 
received peak fl ow meters, instructions in how to use them, and 
monthly tracking of meter readings, but this information was not 
provided to their pharmacists. In the second (usual care) control 
group, patients interviewed monthly to see how they were doing, 
but they received no meters and their pharmacists received no 
information about them. Pharmacists in both control groups had 
a training session informing them about asthma and guidelines 
for self-care but received no patient data or educational materials. 
At the end of the study, patients who received the intervention 
from their pharmacists seemed to have better lung function, and 
they were more satisfi ed with their care. However, there was no 
difference in their adherence to care guidelines, and they were 
twice as likely to be hospitalized. So, as in the earlier study, the 
information provided to the pharmacists may have caused harm to 
the patients, or alternatively, it may have sensitized pharmacists to 
patients who were ill and needed more intensive treatments.
Evidence about the benefi ts of enhanced patient communication 
is still up in the air. It’s still not clear what effect electronic health 
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records are going to have because we’re still working on the 
process of managing the system. 
Unintended Consequences of CPOE
In October 2002 the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, a tertiary-
care level facility with many infants transported from other 
hospitals into their ICU, implemented a CPOE system in response 
to the IOM’s (1999) landmark report and the Leapfrog Group’s 
(2000) promotion of this technology, which we had studied a 
decade earlier and had been using hospital-wide ever since. 
Eighteen months later, researchers found that, as expected, “CPOE 
implementation...resulted in signifi cant reductions in harmful 
adverse drug events (ADEs)” (Han et al. 2005). However, they also 
found that the hospital also experienced an unexpected increase in 
mortality from 2.8% before CPOE implementation to 6.6% after 
implementation. They ruled out demographic or clinical factors 
and then focused on changes in the usual “chain of events” when 
a critically sick infant was being admitted to the ICU after CPOE 
implementation. They found that the medical team’s response 
time was slower, some doctors and nurses were being pulled away 
from the patient’s bedside to operate computer terminals, and 
critical face-to-face interactions between physicians and nurses had 
declined. These things happened because the CPOE system was 
hard to use and occasionally overburdened, suffering processing 
delays. Sometimes the information didn’t go to the right person so 
there were delays in getting things done, which in a newborn ICU 
can make the difference between life and death. 
From this we learned that technologies are tools for improving 
the health care system, but they’re not standalone fi xes. You can’t 
just throw medical records and clinical decision support tools 
into health care settings and expect something good to happen. 
Information technology has to be part of a careful and complete 
re-engineering of the health care system that learns how to 
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function effi ciently and effectively and use electronic information. 
Sometimes there’s too much reliance on technology and ‘geeks’ 
and not enough on clinical acumen and common sense. The best 
use of health information technology incorporates all of these into 
enhanced systems that are more effi cient and safer, but this takes 
diligence on the part of those implementing such systems.
CPOE Can Lower the Cost of Health Care
In the early 1980s, we looked at our local data and found that many 
outpatient tests were often repeated for no obvious reason, so in 
1987 we studied whether using our outpatient CPOE system to 
display previous diagnostic test results would lower the ordering 
of subsequent diagnostic tests (Tierney et al. 1987). Half of each 
physician’s patients were randomized as control patients and 
half were randomized so that when physicians ordered one of the 
eight most commonly ordered diagnostic tests in our practice, 
the CPOE system displayed the most recent previous results for 
that test. Compared to the pre-study period, when physicians 
saw their patients’ previous test results, they ordered 17% fewer 
tests compared to a drop of 11% when the past results were not 
displayed. As a result of fewer tests, the costs associated with those 
patients’ care also dropped signifi cantly. Unfortunately, as soon as 
the previous test result display was discontinued, test orders began 
to return to their previous levels. This told us that we weren’t 
just educating physicians about the number of tests they were 
ordering—they also needed the constant display of past results. 
Ever since, we show the most recent result (and its date) whenever 
any outpatient diagnostic test is ordered. 
We performed a similar study in which we developed statistical 
equations to predict the probability of an abnormality being 
detected as a result of eight commonly ordered diagnostic 
tests (Tierney et al. 1988). We divided the subject patients into 
intervention and control groups, and whenever the physician 
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ordered one of the tests for a patient in the intervention group using 
the outpatient CPOE system, the computer displayed the likelihood 
that the test would show the abnormality that the physician had 
selected as the main one of interest. “For example, if the physician 
ordered a serum electrolyte panel and listed hyperkalemia as the 
abnormality of concern, the computer presented the probability of 
hyperkalemia” (p. 1196). After viewing the computer’s prediction, 
the physician could choose to cancel the test or continue to order 
it. Physicians did not see probabilities for their control patients. 
Among the 112 physicians and more than 9,000 patients involved 
in this study, there was a signifi cant, although small, reduction 
in testing when they got the probability information, but it was 
mainly among tests with a low risk of abnormal results. This was 
the fi rst study showing that physicians would respond to specifi c 
numeric probability predictions. Once again, after the intervention 
was discontinued test ordering returned to the pre-study levels.
Finally, our simplest intervention was when the computer display 
just said “This is what the test you just ordered costs, and here’s 
the total cost of all of the tests you’ve ordered today” (Tierney et 
al. 1990). When we did that, there was a 13 percent reduction in 
test ordering. But once again, “the effects of this intervention did 
not persist after it was discontinued” (p. 1499).
Given the potential fi nancial benefi ts (and signifi cant costs!) of 
EHRs, do they ultimately cost money or save money? Samuel 
Wang and colleagues in the Harvard group conducted a cost-
benefi t study to analyze the fi nancial effects of EHRs on health 
care organizations, using data from their own institution and a 
previously published literature review (Wang et al. 2003). They 
concluded that over a 5-year period, the average net benefi t 
was $86,400 per provider, “primarily from savings in drug 
expenditures, improved utilization of radiology tests, better capture 
of charges, and decreased billing errors” (2003, 397). However, 
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they noted that “The magnitude of the return is sensitive to several 
key factors” (2003, 397). They were being optimistic. 
The RAND group reviewed all of the studies that looked at the 
cost of implementing health information technology (HIT) using 
data from a large survey of health care facilities’ adoption of and 
plans to adopt HIT (Hillestad et al. 2005). They included in the 
adoption category organizations that had contracted for but had not 
yet installed an EMR system, and they surveyed the literature for 
evidence of the effects of HIT. They noted that, 
In general, the currently useful evidence is not 
robust enough to make strong predictions, and we 
describe our results only as ‘potential’...[that is,] 
‘assuming that interconnected and interoperable 
EMR systems are adopted widely and used 
effectively.’ (p. 1104) 
They concluded, 
[E]ffective EMR implementation and networking 
could eventually save more than $81 billion 
annually—by improving health care effi ciency 
and safety—and that HIT-enabled prevention and 
management of chronic disease could eventually 
double those savings while increasing health and 
other social benefi ts. However, this is unlikely to be 
realized without related changes to the health care 
system. (p. 1103)
Maybe Electronic Health Records save money, maybe they don’t. 
But I’m going to argue that’s not why we’re installing them. We’re 
putting them in because we have to communicate. Using EHRs 
is the only way to do so in the 21st century with its increasingly 
complex and disconnected health care.
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Looking to the Future
So where’s the edge of the water? The high speed Internet is 
going to increase our capability of communicating through EHRs. 
We’re going to be able to show real x-ray images, displaying the 
same dense images anywhere in the country as in the hospital 
that generated them. So we can actually have people reading your 
x-rays who don’t have to sit in your hospital. This could be good 
(i.e., having world-class specialists reading x-rays) or bad (i.e., 
physicians not having a local radiologist to discuss the x-ray with). 
HIT is a two-edged sword.
There will be better provider-computer interfaces, better 
graphic design, touch screen technology, portable devices, voice 
recognition, etc.: this is all coming. Much of it is already here. 
The radiologists in my hospital use a voice recognition system 
to dictate x-ray reports. And we get the results in the patient’s 
electronic record less than an hour after an x-ray is taken. Better 
devices, wireless technology, small tablet computers, and better 
health information technology will all improve how we practice 
medicine. 
Everybody uses the Internet browser, right? How many of you ever 
took a course in how to use it? Why not? Because it’s obvious how 
to use it. Well, our health-related technology needs to be obvious 
too. You shouldn’t need a manual. You shouldn’t need instructions. 
You should be able to sit down, log in, and know right off the bat 
how to use it. It ought to be obvious, and it’s getting to be that way. 
There will also be lots of new options for devices and platforms. If 
I’m working in the emergency department, I need to be mobile. If 
I’m working in radiology, I don’t want to be mobile. So let’s have 
different options that fi t people’s workfl ow. 
We need better actionable care guidelines. What needs to be done 
better? What data do we need to capture to do it better? And how 
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do we get that information to the right people at the right time? 
How do better prepare clinicians, facilities, computer information 
offi cers, etc., to take full advantage of electronic media and not 
be hamstrung by it? We all have to be willing to accept these 
changes in our work environment. We have to expect to have 
the right information at the right time and be willing and able to 
work together to make all this happen. In this new era of health 
information technology, some will consider it to be heaven while 
others will think it’s hell. But like it or not, the dawn of a new era 
is here. Some of us have been in this era since the 1970s; the rest 
of US health care is entering this world now, too. I don’t know 
where it’s going to take us, but it’s going to be an interesting ride. I 
can’t predict how it’s going to go, and it’s been painful for a lot of 
people. But in my mind, the benefi ts will ultimately be worth the 
costs. 
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